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It is commonplace to speak of Charter rights, to say that the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 has brought a new dimension to the law, to the Constitution, to the 
roles of Parliament and the courts.
We all have in mind the oft—quoted statement of Lamer J., as he then was, in 
the Reference re s.94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.)2:
The issue in this case raises fundamental questions of constitutional theoiy, 
including the nature and the veiy legitimacy of constitutional adjudication under 
the Charter as well as the appropriateness of various techniques of constitutional 
interpretation.
...It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in 
our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of 
the people of Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of 
constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous 
responsibility. Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any 
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.3
This new role has a number of aspects. The Charter is a recognition of the dignity 
of the human person, its most important attributes and what they call for on the 
part of society and of Government in particular. It is an inducement to all of us 
to recognize the equal inherent worth of every person, and for every person both 
to act accordingly and require recognition.
In the field that is yours and mine, the Charter is a call to all of us involved 
in the law and particularly the judges to share in defining these rights, in weighing 
them and thereby setting standards, or more precisely a framework, limits to be 
abided by by legislators, their delegates, the executive branch of Government and 
administrators.
This role which is assigned to the courts is not entirely new. Think for a 
moment of the law of torts where courts have been called upon from time 
immemorial to determine what is negligence, setting standards of care. Equally 
in our federal system, courts, in deciding upon the division of powers, have been
’justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. Lecture delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of New 
Brunswick, 7 February, 1991.
^art I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .ll 
[hereinafter Charter].
2[1985] 2 S.GR. 486.
called upon to set aside acts of Parliament.
What is new, however, is the extent to which the law is being called upon to 
set standards by which the acts of Parliament themselves are to be judged.
The Charter has brought to the law a vast area where previously the law did 
not dare tread except within narrow limits, matters which society left to be 
governed solely by morality and sanctioned by conscience, family and church.
Undoubtedly, this development is a great step, a necessary step forward in the 
evolution of our society and the world necessary because of the increasing 
complexity of society and social relationships which carry with them the need for 
guidance, necessary because of the increasing diversity of individual backgrounds 
and values.
The, Charter, however is but a small first step and must be heard as a call for 
personal dedication to a better society, for this goal cannot be fulfilled by paper 
declarations. The Charter raises great hopes but as any other human endeavour, 
it does have its downside, its drawbacks. It is a stimulant to us to realize the exist­
ence of rights and to work for them. It is an attractive stimulant because it offers 
the image of a carrot. However, it can also induce aggressiveness and conflict. 
For a right means nothing if it is not respected, not satisfied. In legal terms, it 
means nothing if there is not a corresponding duty to satisfy the right. This must 
be the duty of someone or some institution. Duties are much less attractive and 
far less saleable than rights. However, it is they that give reality to rights.
Indeed, one should be reminded that traditionally our law, our moral precepts 
going back to the Ten Commandments and, indeed, Genesis were expressed in 
terms of duties, obligations. One might say that if everyone fulfilled their duties, 
there would be no need for rights.
This aspect of the Charter is, I believe, much less spoken to. It is almost like 
the other side of the moon, unseen, perhaps forgotten and unattractive, yet vitally 
important.
I would invite you to consider it. It is important in many ways and at many 
levels to you, of course, in your everyday life, in your choice of career and in the 
manner you engage in them. It is not the moment to deal with this aspect of 
things.
But this also has an important bearing on your approach to the law, to the 
Charter and even in the way you may present and argue Charter cases.
A right cannot be seen in isolation. It must be considered in relation to other 
rights in terms of balancing rights. This has largely been the focus of section 1 of
the Charter up to this time. However, even more immediately to every right 
corresponds a duty, and both rights and duties have consequences. Rights have 
consequences largely in terms of the benefits which they provide. Duties have 
consequences in terms of the burdens they impose. In defining the extent of rights 
and balancing rights, regard must be had both to the benefits and the burdens. 
But for you, in arguing for or against a right, all of these aspects should be 
considered. One must consider the effects not only of the rights but of the duties, 
as well as upon whom the duty rests and how it can be met and also enforced. 
For one must ever keep in mind that a law by itself is powerless to ensure the 
fulfilment of duties, in the sense that unless a law is generally accepted and abided 
by it will soon become ineffective and a dead letter. The willingness to abide by 
the law is at the root of the proper functioning of society. It tests our sense of 
responsibility which must inspire our whole way of life. It is essential to the 
operation of the rule of law and of any democracy. Responsibility is both a moral 
and a legal concept. It underlies and must inspire the law, but for society to 
function properly it must inspire action well beyond the specific requirements of 
the law.
To illustrate, let us think of one of our prime concerns these days, the 
environment. While we are calling for more laws and regulations to protect the 
environment, and rightly so, I think we are all conscious that protection of the 
environment involves both broadly-based measures such as those for the discharge 
of industrial and community wastes and every day activities. One can no more 
legislate cleanliness than virtue if people are not prepared to abide by the laws. 
The same is true of the Charter, and we in particular who have chosen the law as 
our life’s work must have a special sense of responsibility vis-à-vis the Charter.
The Charter sets forth the underlying minimum standards by which our society 
is to be governed. It is the basic statement of our social consensus. It is all the 
more necessary as the former consensus attached to a more homogeneous society 
tends to wane. It is the duty of all of us to put flesh on this consensus. This 
cannot be easily accomplished in the face of a diminishing bank of common 
standards which results in good measure from the coming together of the world. 
This coming together, in turn, sets the path to a new social consensus which we 
have no choice but to achieve.
The novelty of the Charter and the greater awareness of rights have naturally 
enough led us to place the emphasis on rights. We are now becoming more 
conscious of the necessity of balancing rights, of finding means of reconciling rights 
and that, in this process, we must have regard to their effects, to the duties to 
which they give rise.
We require the best of minds, the best of dedication and the best of 
experience. For this, we must look to ourselves, but also look to others. In this 
country, we are fortunate to be the heirs to the two great legal traditions of the
western world: the common law and the civilian traditions. These give us a special 
opening to be interested and informed as to the insights of comparative law. We 
need to draw on all available sources of information and experience; at the same 
time we must do so with discernment and not allow ourselves to be smothered in 
information which loses its significance for us. We have at hand resources and 
working instruments unheard of a very few years ago. At the same time, we must 
not allow their marvels to tempt us away from thought and reflection. Our eyes 
must remain firmly cast on what is essential, the greater respect for and fulfilment 
of the human person.
Over the few years since the adoption of the Charter, the Supreme Court has 
undertaken the task of setting some guidelines for the definition and balancing of 
rights under the Charter. The process is necessarily piecemeal and continuing as 
the various cases which come before the Court call for solution and offer 
opportunities. Former Chief Justice Dickson has compared this work to the 
building of the cathedral at Chartres. One may also compare it to a painting upon 
which colour is added and created stroke by stroke of the brush. Unlike a 
cathedral or a painting, however, the work of the Charter will never be complete, 
it is the work of life itself. The decisions of the Court on the application of 
section 1 of the Charter are living illustrations of this.
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Oakes4 established the basic test for 
the application of section 1. In that case, the Court was faced with an accused 
who was caught in possession of narcotics. The Narcotic Control Act5 provided 
that the Court could presume that the accused was in possession of narcotics for 
the purpose of trafficking, unless he or she could prove to the contrary. This was, 
therefore, a case dealing with a so-called “reverse onus” clause.
Of course the problem with a reverse onus clause is that it seems to 
undermine one of our most basic legal principles — the presumption of innocence, 
enshrined in section 11(d) of the Charter. And this was precisely the challenge in 
Oakes. Once the Court determined that the reverse onus clause infringed section 
11(d), it had to decide whether section 1 could justify the infringement. How was 
the Court to balance an individual’s right to be presumed innocent with public 
need to convict drug traffickers?
To answer these questions, the majority of the court formulated a multiple test 
for applying section 1, now known as the Oakes test which required that the 
government persuade the Court of two things:
4[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
5R.S.C. 1970, c. N-l.
First, that the legislative objective was of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding the constitutional right or freedom.
Second, that the infringement or limitation of the right be proportional to the 
important legislative objective. This “proportionality branch” was said to have 
three elements:
1) the legislation must be rationally connected to the objective
— not arbitrary or based on irrational considerations;
2) it should impair the right as little as possible; and
3) its effects must be proportional to the objective.
In applying this test to the situation in Oakes, the Supreme Court adopted 
what may seem, in today’s light, a strict approach. It held that the limitation on 
the right to be presumed innocent was not proportional to the legislative objective 
of curbing drug trafficking by facilitating the conviction of drug traffickers. The 
means were not justified by the legislative end, because the reverse onus clause 
was found to be irrational, hence in violation of the first branch of the 
proportionality test. It was not rational to infer that a person had an intent to 
traffic simply because he or she possessed a very small quantity of narcotics. This 
irrationality was unjustifiable in the context of a limitation of the right to a 
presumption of innocence, or what then Chief Justice Dickson coined as:
a hallowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal law...
a principle which confirms our faith in humankind; it reflects our belief that 
individuals are decent and law-abiding members of the community until proven 
otherwise.6
Following the Oakes decision, some may have expected that section 1 would 
always be applied rigidly and strictly, irrespective of the particular factual and legal 
context in which Charter litigation arose. But over time, and up to the present 
day, the inaccuracy of that perspective has become quite evident. It can readily 
be seen that the collage of Charter jurisprudence which the Supreme Court has 
been painting is of a rather more nuanced, flexible nature. Mr. Justice La Forest 
expressed this view very pointedly in the recent criminal extradition case of U.SA,. 
v. Cotroni? Writing for the majority of the Court, he stated that the Oakes test 
cannot be applied.
...in too rigid a fashion, without regard to the context in which it is to be applied, 
for the language of the Charter invites a measure of flexibility...
A mechanistic approach must be avoided because, the underlying values must be 
sensitively weighed in a particular context against other values of a free and
6Oakes, supra, note 4 at 119-20.
7[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
democratic society to be promoted by the legislature.8
To better see this contextual approach in action, I propose to outline the 
unique way the Court has applied section 1 in a variety of settings. As just one 
example, it is somewhat instructive to isolate the Court’s approach to a Charter 
case where one social or economic group is pitted against another as compared 
to a case like Oakes, where an individual’s right under the criminal law was 
infringed by the public apparatus of the police and the judicial system.
The case of R. v. Edwards Books and Art L td9 may be taken to illustrate this 
distinction. Although it was decided very close on the heels of Oakes, already the 
contextual approach was in evidence.
The Supreme Court was confronted in Edwards Books with a challenge to the 
validity of an Ontario statute (the Retail Business Holidays Act),10 requiring 
retailers of a certain size to close their businesses on Sunday, to promote the 
secular objective of a uniform holiday, or “common pause day” for retail workers. 
The statute was primarily challenged for violating certain retailers’ freedom of 
religion under section 2(a) of the Charter. After an extensive analysis of the 
various conditions and exemptions built into the statute, the majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of religion of some Saturday 
observers was abridged by the Ontario law. However, it also determined that the 
abridgement was justifiable as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter, 
and was therefore upheld.
A complex amalgam of interests and values was at stake in the balancing act 
under section 1: the interest of retail workers in a guaranteed day of rest, the 
religious freedom of Sunday observers and of retailers whose Sabbath fell on a day 
other than Sunday, the commercial liberty of all retailers, as well as the religious 
freedoms and commercial interests of Ontario’s consumers. Yet, despite this 
diversity of interests and values, section 1 commanded that the Court provide a 
principled legal answer to the question of how far the right to freedom of religion 
could justifiably be infringed.
Upon determining that the objective of securing a common day of rest was of 
sufficient importance to warrant overriding the section 2(a) right, the majority of 
the Court delved into a proportionality analysis of whether the legislative means 
abridged freedom of religion reasonably and “as little as possible.” In giving 
meaning to that term, the Court assessed a few alternative legislative schemes 
which the legislature might have enacted, but chose not to adopt. In particular,
^bid. at 1489-90.
9[1986] 2 S.GR. 713 [hereinafter Edwards Books].
10R .S .0 .1980, c.453.
it evaluated whether the legislature could be faulted for providing an exemption 
for retail stores with fewer than seven employees working on a Sunday.
Former Chief Justice Dickson took the occasion to provide some careful 
insight into the application of section 1 in this type of legal setting. He indicated 
to us that:
Legislative choices regarding alternative forms of business regulation do not generally 
impinge on the values and provisions of the Charter of Rights, and the resultant 
legislation need not be turned with great precision in order to withstand judicial 
scrutiny.
Simplicity and administrative convenience are legitimate concerns for the drafters 
of such legislation.
A “reasonable limit” is one which, having regard to the principles enunciated in 
Oakes, it was reasonable for the legislature to impose. The courts are not called 
upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to 
draw a precise line.11 (emphasis added)
With these principles as guides, the majority of the Court concluded that the 
legislature deserved a certain measure of deference. It had sought to limit the 
infringement as little as reasonably could be expected in choosing an effective 
means of achieving the objective of a common day of rest.
A somewhat similar approach to that in Edwards Books may be found in the 
context of a Charter dispute arising a few years ago in the Province of Quebec, 
where a toy manufacturer challenged a provision of the Quebec Consumer 
Protection Act.12 The manufacturer claimed that the Act’s ban on television 
advertising directed at persons under 13 years of age was an unconstitutional 
violation of its section 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression. That case is 
Irwin Toy v. The Attorney General of Quebec.13
The factual complexity of Irwin Toy called upon latent resources of section 1 
jurisprudence not previously tested. The Court was presented with a bewildering 
barrage of social science reports, government studies and academic analyses; all 
with their own particular penchant and perspective on the issue. One even 
devoted attention to the impact of the legislation on Captain Kangaroo. Once the 
Court decided that the impugned provision infringed section 2(b), the Court had 
the rather daunting task of determining whether the resultant infringement was 
justified under section 1 of the Charter.
uEdwards Bodes, supra, note 9 at 772, 781-82.
12RS.Q., c.P-40.1.
13[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
The Court determined at the outset that the purpose of the prohibition was 
to protect a group must vulnerable to commercial manipulation. This objective 
was based on a sufficiently pressing and substantial concern. Following the 
framework of Oakes, the Court then concluded that the ban was rational because 
it was directed only at the vulnerable group -  children under 13 -  and not at their 
parents. As for the minimal impairment branch, Chief Justice Dickson and 
Justices Wilson and La Forest stated:
What will be ‘as little as possible’ [impairment] will of course vary depending on 
the government objective and on the means available to achieve it...
Thus, in matching means to ends and asking whether rights and freedoms are 
impaired as little as possible, a legislature mediating between the claims of 
competing groups will be forced to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute 
certainty concerning how that balance is best struck...
The choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an assessment 
of conflicting social science evidence and differing justified demands on scarce 
resource. Thus, as courts review the results of the legislature’s deliberations, 
particularly with respect to the protection o f vulnerable groups, they must be mindful 
of the legislature’s representative function.
[For example, when] regulating industiy or business, it is open to the legislature 
to restrict its legislative reforms to sectors in which there appear to be particularly 
urgent concerns or to constituencies that seem especially needy.
In other cases, however, rather than mediating between different groups, the 
government is best characterized as the singular antagonist o f the individual whose 
right has been infringed ... In such circumstances, and indeed whenever the 
government’s purpose relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judicial system, the courts can assess with some certainty whether the “least drastic 
means” for achieving the purpose have been chosen.
... the same degree o f  certainty may not be achievable in cases involving the 
reconciliation o f  claims o f competing individuals or groups or the distribution o f  
scarce government resources.14 (emphasis added.)
On the basis of these distinctions, the Court upheld the infringement under 
section 1. It deferred to the rationality of the Quebec legislature, taking into 
account a variety of special factors: 1) the commercial nature of the regulations;
2) the vulnerability of the group at stake; (3) the classification of the dispute as 
one between competing groups; and 4) the conflicting nature of the available social 
science evidence — evidence whose implications reasonable people could disagree 
upon.
Even at this point in the discussion it may be seen that section 1 has 
experienced an evolution of sorts, and that its application depends on contextual 
considerations. Moreover it has become clear in very recent times, indeed even 
over the past few months, that the range of contexts is open-ended, and that the 
list of special contextual factors which tends to influence the standard of strictness 
of the Oakes test is not closed. The months-old judgments in the cases of 
M c K in n e y Chaulk16, and Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada17 all 
add new colour to the jurisprudence of section 1.
The Supreme Court released its decision in McKinney v. Board of Governors 
of Guelph University,18 in the month of November just passed. Apart from 
determining whether a university was a branch of “government” attracting Charter 
review, McKinney was an equality case, under section 15 of the Charter. Eight 
professors and a university librarian applied for declarations that their universities’ 
policies of mandatory retirement, at the age of 65, were discriminatory and 
violated section 15. The Court was sympathetic to the claim that the policies 
infringed section 15 because its distinction was based on the enumerated personal 
characteristic of age. But in the end the majority held that the limitation was 
reasonable and justified under section 1. Mr. Justice La Forest wrote the 
judgment containing the majority’s section 1 analysis. It was an analysis which 
paid close attention to the factor of scarce public resources.
Two pressing and substantial objectives were readily isolated by Mr. Justice La 
Forest. First was the government’s goal of promoting excellence in higher 
education. Preserving academic freedom was a second. As for proportionality, the 
Court’s majority had little problem identifying a rational connection between 
mandatory retirement policies and these two legislative objectives. In its view, 
mandatory retirement was a burden that universities could reasonably impose on 
professors in exchange for the academic freedom they enjoyed by virtue of the 
institution of tenure -  a benefit not enjoyed by the vast majority of working 
Canadians. It reasoned further that mandatory retirement promoted excellence 
in universities by systematically encouraging a regular infusion from below of new 
professors and ideas. Once again, the more difficult part of the section 1 analysis 
involved the minimal impairment and proportional effects branches of the Oakes 
framework. Just take a minute to reflect on the various interests and values being 
weighed in the balance.
On the one hand were the professors -  highly educated women and men,
13infra, note 18.
l6Infra, note 22.
i7Infra, note 2826.
18[1990] 2 S.CJ. (6 December 1990)[hereinafter McKinney].
devoted to scholarly research and teaching, many or most still highly competent 
and willing to work at the age of 65. They were being told that they must stop 
working in their life’s profession, after a seemingly arbitrary number of years. On 
the other side of the coin were the graduate students who wished to replace the 
more senior professors so that they too could apply themselves to reading and 
research. And of course I shouldn’t forget about university students. I would think 
students will always have a legitimate interest in being introduced to the newest 
ideas and approaches in an academic discipline — whether it be astrophysics, the 
classics or law. And society at large must surely share this interest. Certainly this 
was the Court’s opinion in McKinney.
In this particular context, the Supreme Court in the McKinney case decided 
that it was not possible to consider whether the professors’ equality rights were 
minimally impaired unless it took into account not only the claims of the various 
competing groups but also: “... the proper distribution of scarce resources — here, 
access to the valuable research and other facilities of universities.”19 Since this 
factor was a significant component of the factual setting for the Charter dispute, 
the Court held that to pass over this hurdle of the Oakes test, a university was 
simply required to establish that it had: “... a reasonable basis for concluding that 
mandatory retirement impaired the relevant right as little as possible given their 
pressing and substantial objectives.”20
The Court applied the same flexible standard to the third limb of the 
proportionality test. It held that where academic freedom and excellence in higher 
education are necessary to our continuance as a lively and healthy democracy, 
where staff renewal is vital to that end, and where there is competing social 
science evidence as to the precise effects of limiting legislation, the Court need 
only consider whether the government had a reasonable basis for believing the 
burdensome effects were proportionate to its goals. Furthermore, in the words of 
the majority.
A legislature should not be obliged to deal with all aspects of a problem at 
once. It should be permitted to take incremental measures to balance possible 
inequalities under the law against other inequalities resulting from the 
adoption of a course of action.21
The deference to Parliament or, put differently, the judicial sensitivity to 
Parliament’s functional constraints, was once again recently witnessed, this time 
in the case of R. v. Chaulk,22 in which judgment was released last December. In
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
“ [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 [hereafter Chaulk].
that case, the dispute focused on what was mentioned at the outset of this 
discussion, namely a challenge to a reverse onus clause in the Criminal Code 
based on the right to be presumed innocent. Thus Chaulk has a definite parallel 
with Oakes, and because of that, affords an interesting glimpse of refinements in 
the application of the Oakes test; although it is also true that the case is factually 
unique and, in some respects, possesses quite distinctive implications.
In Chaulk the Court was faced with two accused, 15 and 16 years of age, who 
had been tried and convicted in Winnipeg of first-degree murder. Each had been 
sentenced to life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole for 25 years. The 
only defense raised at their trial was one of insanity. Having lost at trial on the 
insanity claim, the accused argued that one of the insanity provisions in the 
Criminal Code violated section 11(d) of the Charter because it placed the onus of 
proving insanity on the accused. In their view, this burden undermined their right 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the Crown. In other words, the 
two accused argued that section 11(d) of the Charter required the Crown to prove 
the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. If it could not, then the 
insanity defence should automatically apply to preclude their conviction.
The Court found that the reserve onus clause infringed section 11(d). The 
legislative objective was determined to be the purely evidentiary one of relieving 
the prosecution of the tremendous difficulty of proving an accused’s sanity to 
secure a conviction. Yet, unlike the Oakes case, the Court in Chaulk held there 
was a rational connection between ends and means, because placing the 
evidentiary burden on the accused directly promoted the goal of making the 
prosecution’s task less difficult. This branch of proportionality having been 
satisfied, the Court proceeded to analyze “minimal impairment.” Its analysis 
revealed that, even where section 1 is applied in the criminal law context, and thus 
where, to invoke the language of Irwin Toy, the state is “the singular antagonist of 
the individual”23 whose right has been infringed, it will not always follow that a 
very strict standard of minimal impairment will be operative.
The Court conceived of alternative insanity provisions which might have 
trenched less severely on the right to be presumed innocent. It noted that 
Parliament could have prescribed that, when an accused raises insanity as a 
defence, he is first required to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity, after 
which an onus to disprove insanity on a balance of probabilities would fall on the 
Crown. Alternatively, Parliament could have stated that an accused must submit 
to a psychiatric examination at the request of the Crown. However, speaking 
through Chief Justice Lamer, the Court then emphasized that while these 
alternatives might be less intrusive, that did not necessarily mean that when all 
rhingR were considered those less intrusive means would be as effective in
promoting the legislative ends set by Parliament. It stressed even more 
strenuously that the role of the Court did not permit it to second guess these finely 
distinguishable policy choices, especially where it was: “... impossible to know 
what the effects of alternatives would be until they were put into practice.”24
Citing the Court’s judgments in Edwards Books, Irwin Toy, and Reference Re 
ss.193 mid 195.1(l)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.),25 Chief Justice Lamer 
specified that in most contexts:
...Parliament is not required to search out and to adopt the absolutely least 
intrusive means of attaining its objective.
Furthermore, when assessing the alternative means available to Parliament, it 
is important to consider whether a less intrusive means would achieve the 
“same” objective or would achieve the same objective as effectively.26
So, even if the courts identify less intrusive means, if in some way they might 
not be as effective, or if they are possibly not as directly focused on Parliament’s 
policy goals, then the means Parliament has chosen will not fail the minimal 
impairment test. In short, there may be a range of alternatives that are all 
minimally impairing and open to Parliament to choose from as it wishes -  even 
in the criminal law context.
On the facts of Chaulk, the Court held that even thought Parliament may not 
have chosen “the absolutely least intrusive means of meeting its objective,” 
Parliament had chosen from “a range of means which impair section 11(d) as little 
as possible” and that “within this range it is virtually impossible to know, let alone 
be sure, which means violate Charter rights the least.”27 Thus, this branch of 
proportionality was satisfied. And by applying the same rationale to the third 
branch of proportionality, again stressing the “uncertainty of our scientific 
knowledge,” the Court was persuaded to uphold the reverse onus provision.
Before I conclude this discussion, I will touch on one last decision which 
illuminates the nuances of section 1. This is the case of R. v. Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada,28 whose judgment by the Supreme Court was released 
only two weeks ago. It brought before the Court for the first time the question 
of the extent of the Charter guarantee of free expression on state-owned property. 
The reasoning of the Court was divided. I will refer to Madam Justice McLachlin- 
’s section 1 analysis as an example of another variation in approach.
MIbid.
“ [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
26Chaulk, supra, note 22.
”lbid.
^1991] 1 S.CJ. (25 January, 1991)[hereinafter Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada].
The Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada involved a section 2(b) 
challenge to the practice of Dorval airport authorities of preventing all “political 
propaganda activities” on its premises. The practice amounted to a blanket 
exclusion of all political solicitation and advertising on airport grounds. Madam 
Justice McLachlin found that the Committee’s right to freedom of expression 
under section 2(b) was unjustifiably infringed and could not be saved under section
1. Her path to this conclusion was somewhat unique.
In determining whether a limitation of section 2(b) had occurred, Madam 
Justice McLachlin crafted the following framework of questions, or tests. It must 
first be decided whether the government’s objective in imposing the restriction was 
to regulate the content of expression, or whether it was merely to regulate its 
harmful consequences irrespective of content.
If the aim is to regulate content, section 2(b) is infringed, and one proceeds 
to section 1 of the Charter. If, on the other hand, the restriction is aimed only at 
undesirable consequences of the expression, the claimant can only establish a 
violation by showing links between his intended expression, the forum for that 
expression (in this case an an airport), and one of the underlying purposes of the 
section 2(b) guarantee of free speech; 1) the pursuit of truth; 2) political or 
communal participation; and 3) individual fulfilment. If speech in the context of 
the particular forum in dispute does not serve one of these three purposes, then 
section 2(b) is not infringed. For instance, section 2(b) would not be infringed if 
the expression sought to be protected by section 2(b) was “in the sanctum of the 
Prime Minister’s [or Dean’s] office” or in “an airport control tower.”29
In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, there was no question about 
this linkage. Airports were held to be modern equivalents of streets, and the 
speakers at issue in the case sought to engage in political speech. Thus, the Court 
turned to a section 1 analysis, which Madam Justice McLachlin stressed must be 
a balancing act “done contextually, having regard to the facts and values of the 
particular case before the Court: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326, per Wilson J. at 1355-5.”30 In the opinion of Madam Justice McLachlin 
there is a particular way in which section 1 balancing “can best be achieved in a 
case such as this.”31She begins from the following set of premises:
The Charter recognizes that the exercise of constitutional rights inevitably raises 
conflicts. Sometimes the conflict is with another right. Sometimes the conflict is 
with another interest, usually public. As a result, rights cannot be viewed as 
absolute. Sometimes a right must yield to another, conflicting right; sometimes a
*Ibid. at 20.
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right must give way to an overriding objective of public importance.
Only if certain conditions are established can a limit on a fundamental right or 
freedom be justified. First, the state should be required to demonstrate a 
compelling reason for the limitation. Second, the limit on the right should not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective -  it should not be overboard, 
and should contain sufficient safeguards to ensure that as the law is applied, the 
right in fact will not be infringed more than necessary. This latter danger may 
occur, for example, if too much discretion is granted to administrators charged with 
applying the limit or law in question.32 (emphasis added).
These concerns are reflected in R. v. Oakes.
Notice that Madam Justice McLachlin’s formulation of the test for applying 
section 1 does not stop with a general warning about overly mechanistic 
applications of the Oakes criteria. She adds pointedly that:
...the practical limitations of legislation must also be recognized. The reality is that 
the government must develop rules and policies which apply to many cases. It may 
be impossible to tailor a rule to fit the precise circumstances of each individual 
case, with the result that with the benefit of hindsight a less restrictive limit can 
be conceived for a particular situation. As this Court pointed out in R. v. Edwards 
Books and Art Ltd., some deference must be paid to the legislators and the 
difficulties inherent in the process of drafting rules of general application. A limit 
prescribed by law should not be struck out merely because the Court can conceive 
of an alternative which seems to it to be less restrictive. What is required by 
section 1 is that the limrt be reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. If the limit represents a reasonable legislative choice tailored so as to limit 
the right in question as little as possible the minimum impairment required is met. 
What must be guarded against are the evils of vagueness and overbreadth, the broad 
sweep that catches more conduct than is justified by the government’s objective.33 
(latter emphasis added.)
The factors of vagueness, overbreadth and excessive adm inistrative discretion 
are, therefore, thought by Madam Justice McLachlin to constitute particularly 
important features of the context which helps to determine the strictness with 
which section 1 will apply to governmental infringements on the free expression 
of individuals.
Applying this test, Madam Justice McLachlin found that the federal 
government failed to justify the section 2(b) infringements. In the first place, its 
objective was no more than an unsupported assertion, namely that “an airport is 
not an appropriate place for this type of communication.” Secondly, even if the 
objective were sufficient, the means it did not pass muster under section 1 of the
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Charter, because there was no proportionality between preserving an airport’s 
silence and a blanket exclusion of all political propaganda activities in the airport
— the exclusion being unrelated to the airport’s function — especially where the 
exclusion was devoid of safeguards to protect against over-reaching application.
Well, so much for strokes of the brush under section 1. May they serve to 
illustrate the many aspects and possible approaches to the delicate task of defining 
and balancing Charter rights and their less spoken to partner, Charter duties, and 
be an invitation to creative and sensitive thinking.
As a parting word, may I invite you to treat the Charter with respect for the 
importance which it has, conscious of its strengths and limits, and invoke it with 
discernment and awareness of the many facets of the rights which it grants and the 
duties which it creates. In its development at various times, the accent will be 
placed on certain aspects more than others. This is natural. There are and will 
be fashions in this area as in others. However, let us be conscious of this and 
retain our awareness and sense of responsibility for the promotion of all Charter 
rights and not allow the fad of the moment to let us forget and delay tackling 
other more difficult, important and perhaps intractable problems.
In the justice system, we are particularly entrusted with maintaining a balance 
through the protection of those whose rights are disregarded and who are less able 
to protect themselves. This holds true for institutions as well. The political 
process tends to favour the new, more glamorous projects sometimes at the 
expense of maintaining the continuity and reasonable development of existing 
services. The administration of justice is not immune from this. Generally, it is 
not glamorous and it does not directly affect most of the population, yet it is a 
cornerstone of our social structure. You, as future lawyers, law professors and 
judges, have a special duty towards it. Even if your career leads you along other 
paths, the knowledge and awareness which you have acquired during your studies 
give you a special responsibility to promote the awareness of the justice system, 
its administration and its needs. For it does have special needs and does require 
special understanding. The function of a judge is unique. His fellow citizens have 
confided in him their greatest trust, namely that of judging their acts. He must be 
impartial, independent and should be exemplary in his way of life. He may be in 
the limelight of the media but must not seek it, nor respond to criticism. He is 
not allowed to speak in his defence though he may on occasion speak in 
furtherance of the administration of justice. As people knowledgeable in the law 
and the administration of justice, you have a special responsibility in promoting a 
better understanding of the work of judges, their responsibilities and their needs. 
They are directly connected to the values of our society and like them can never 
be taken for granted but require continued vigilance, understanding and support.
